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Despite its evident universality and high social value, the ultimate biological role of music and its connection to brain disorders remain poorly under-
stood. Recent findings from basic neuroscience have shed fresh light on these old problems. New insights provided by clinical neuroscience concerning
the effects of brain disorders promise to be particularly valuable in uncovering the underlying cognitive and neural architecture of music and for
assessing candidate accounts of the biological role of music. Here we advance a new model of the biological role of music in human evolution and
the link to brain disorders, drawing on diverse lines of evidence derived from comparative ethology, cognitive neuropsychology and neuroimaging studies
in the normal and the disordered brain. We propose that music evolved from the call signals of our hominid ancestors as a means mentally to rehearse
and predict potentially costly, affectively laden social routines in surrogate, coded, low-cost form: essentially, a mechanism for transforming emotional
mental states efficiently and adaptively into social signals. This biological role of music has its legacy today in the disordered processing of music and
mental states that characterizes certain developmental and acquired clinical syndromes of brain network disintegration.
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INTRODUCTION
Music is universal and generally highly valued in human societies.
These attributes are biologically grounded in the phylogenetically
ancient neural machinery of emotion, reward and memory (Zatorre
and Salimpoor, 2013). Young children reliably identify emotions
expressed in music (Terwogt and Van Grinsven, 1988). As a means
of emotional communication, music may have led language, even as
our passions lead our reason (Rousseau, 1781). However, for neuro-
scientists no less than philosophers, the problem remains: why should
these abstract auditory patterns, of no obvious contemporary biolo-
gical value, be so powerfully embedded in the mental life and neuro-
biology of our species? A number of solutions have been proposed
(Table 1), but previous accounts have not agreed a unifying evolution-
ary principle or, indeed, whether any such principle even exists (James,
1890; Dawkins, 1976; Patel, 2008).
Recent findings from cognitive neuroscience have shed new light on
this old problem. Potential precursors to speech have been identified in
geladas (Bergman, 2013) and hint at an evolutionary mechanism that
may also be relevant to other modes of human social vocal behaviour,
such as singing. Our emotional evaluation of music has been shown to
depend on the dynamic interplay of multiple hierarchically organized
brain mechanisms; these mechanisms are instantiated in distributed
brain networks, including basal forebrain regions that encode
biological drives and rewards, limbic regions that represent and
evaluate emotional states, temporo-parietal cortical areas that
represent structural harmonic and rhythmic properties of music,
mesial temporal structures that support episodic memory and
prefrontal areas that mediate psychological expectancy and social
cognition processes (Huron, 2006; Downey et al., 2013; Juslin, 2013;
Koelsch, 2013; Salimpoor et al., 2013; Zatorre and Salimpoor, 2013;
Mas-Herrero et al., 2014).
A MUSIC BIOLOGICAL RATIONALE FOR STUDYING
BRAIN DISORDERS
A further complementary approach to understanding the neurobiology
of complex cognitive phenomena such as music is to assess neuropsy-
chological effects of brain damage on those phenomena. This clinically
focussed approach is neurobiologically compelling for two key reasons.
First, in contrast to studies in the healthy brain, clinical studies (in
general) identify neural substrates that are critical for function rather
than merely epiphenomenal and delineate the relations between
cognitive subprocesses (for example, by demonstrating that particular
functions can dissociate). Second, the window opened by brain
disorders on underlying cognitive architecture is particularly germane
to the case of music, for which original biological functions have been
largely obscured by the now dominant effects of cultural evolution.
While we cannot rerun hominid evolution, the effects of brain damage
can, in part, recapitulate the original evolutionary pathway. A substan-
tial body of clinical data has now been amassed regarding the effects on
music structural and emotion processing in developmental and
acquired brain disorders, including autism (Allen et al., 2009; Caria
et al., 2011; Allen et al., 2013), stroke and other focal lesions (Jacome,
1984; Griffiths et al., 2004; Satoh et al., 2011), as well as neurodegen-
erative diseases (Drapeau et al., 2009; Hailstone et al., 2009; Omar
et al., 2011; Hsieh et al., 2012; Downey et al., 2013). These disorders
target diverse brain systems including those mediating social cognition
and theory of mind, semantic knowledge, emotion processing and
biological reward. This clinical literature provides further evidence
that musical deficits can be selectively linked to particular disease
processes and that symbiotic, but separable cognitive and neural
modules process music and language (Peretz, 2006).
OUTLINE FOR A NEW MODEL OF THE BIOLOGICAL
ROLE OF MUSIC
Here we propose a new evolutionary model of music as a biologically
sanctioned mechanism for transforming private, emotional mental
states efficiently into public social signals. The model is outlined in
Figure 1, alongside evolutionary biological ‘problems’ putatively
‘solved’ by each component of the model. We argue that music evolved
(initially as ‘proto-music’) from the call signals of our hominid ances-
tors as a means to mentally rehearse potentially costly affectively laden
social routines in surrogate coded form with high potential value, but
low actual cost to hominids possessing the capacity. Implicit in our use
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of ‘costly’, here is the assumption that the physical, neural or emo-
tional resources expended by actually engaging in the corresponding
behavioural routines would have outweighed the resources invested in
generating their proto-musical surrogates; we argue that this condition
would have been met initially for high-stakes social scenarios such as
mate selection, infant bonding, predatory threats and social separation.
Vocal re-coding of such scenarios would have established adaptive
linkages between brain mechanisms for processing biologically salient
affective states and mechanisms for auditory signal analysis
(Pressnitzer et al., 2011; Zatorre and Salimpoor, 2013) and fur-
thermore, this musical capacity may have evolved cooperatively with
a capacity for interpreting mental states, mentalizing or ‘theory of
mind’ (Downey et al., 2013). We further argue that brain disorders
expose the neuropsychological and neuroanatomical traces of this evo-
lutionary role of music. We now present our model in detail, before
considering how brain disorders inform the components of the model.
Table 1 Proposed biological roles of music in human evolution: taxonomy of accounts
Author Proposed primary biological role of music Relationship to language Cognitive and neural mechanisms
Neural or cultural epiphenomenon
James, 1890 Incidental peculiarity of our nervous system Incidental to language By-product of language circuitry
Dawkins, 1976 Cultural communication via memes Alternative memetic communication systems Imitation circuitry
Pinker, 1997 Pleasurable epiphenomenon: ‘auditory cheesecake’ Parasitic on language Co-opted generic processors (e.g. learning and reward)
Falk, 2004 Motherese facilitates speech processing; adaptive fora-
ging and signalling strategy with remote infants
Prelinguistic vocal substrates for protolanguage with
emergence of learned linguistic conventions
Prosody processing in tandem with speech capacity
evolved in late australopithecines/early Homo
Jackendoff and Lerdahl,
2006
Elaboration of language faculty using an alternative
symbolic code
‘Spandrel’ of language Generic and domain-specific cognitive and neural (per-
ceptual and affective) modules acting in concert
Patel, 2008 Emotional and aesthetic communication at cultural level,
music-specific emotions
Analogous formal, categorical and combinatorial sound-
based codes
Innate neural mechanisms process sound regularities
modified by musical experience
Courtship and other biological signals
Darwin, 1871 Courtship routines and territoriality Pre-propositional musical protolanguage Trans-specific vocal processing, imitative learning
Jespersen, 1922 Expression of instincts and strong emotions linked pre-
eminently to courtship
Pre-cognitive protolanguage and training of speech
organs by singing
Unspecified mechanisms mediating sexual selection
Miller, 2000 Courtship rituals and sexual selection Language emerged from syntactic structures developed
in musical vocal displays
Overlapping language and music areas in prefrontal and
neocerebellar cortices
Social bonding and cohesion
Brown, 2000a, b Promotes group cooperation, coordination, cohesion of
actions, thought and emotion expression
Homologous shared ancestor: ‘musilanguage’.
Preferential processing for emotion (music) and ref-
erents (language)
Shared neuroanatomical substrates; stronger grounding
of music in neurobiology and genetics
Cross, 2005 Social cohesion and cooperation and exploration of
social behaviours with indeterminate outcomes
Alternative semantic systems varying in referential
specificity
Orbitofrontal and limbic circuitry
Dunbar et al., 2012 Enhanced coherence of social group and pair bonds,
‘vocal grooming’
Singing emerging first from vocal calls Parasitized neocortical and neurochemical (e.g.
endorphins)
Koelsch, 2011, 2013 Semanticized non-verbal communication code with
extra-musical musicogenic meanings (emotion, inten-
tion), promoting social cohesion and strengthening
inter-individual attachments
Continuum, music-primed language development via
acoustic and structural similarities
Multimodal integrative, learning, social cognition and
relative specificity from interaction of mechanisms
Emotional signalling
Rousseau, 1781 Expression of strong emotions: love and hate ‘Passionate’ precursor to ‘rationality’ of language Unspecified
Mithen, 2005 Long-range manipulation of others’ emotional states;
from ‘motherese’, facilitated pair-bonds, social
cohesion
Common prototypical ‘musi-language’ with subsequent
divergence; pitch preceded rhythm and language
Mechanisms for vocal signal processing and some spe-
cialization for music
McDermott and Hauser,
2005
Aesthetic response to innate perceptual sensitivities and
regularities; emotional communication
Alternative expressions of innate cognitive organization
constrained by experience
General learning mechanisms driven by both neural and
cultural factors, shaped by experience
Bharucha et al, 2006 Formal signalling code for emotion and mood regulation Parallel non-propositional communication codes Mechanisms for processing vocal emotion
Peretz, 2006 ‘Education’ of emotions and auditory system derived
from mother–infant communication
Unclearpotentially preceded or parallel Partial specialization of cognitive and neural modules
exposed by effects of brain damage with plasticity
Vocal learning and non-verbal communication
Merker, 2000 Expressive mimesis and vocal learning Key stage in vocal evolution leading to language Perceptual, discriminative, attention, motor and learning
Fitch, 2006 Multiple selection pressures (e.g. sexual selection, infant
caregiving and social cohesion)
Analogous formal system lacking semantic content Innate mechanisms for complex vocal and hierarchical
learning
Pattern decoding and problem-solving
Huron, 2006 ITPRA model of musical expectation generating physio-
logical responses, emotion and adaptive behaviours
Mutual interactions during evolution with formal
analogies
Pattern processors linked to affective, neurochemical and
autonomic adaptive mechanisms
Pressnitzer et al., 2011 Rehearsal of emotional states minus painful outcomes,
ambiguity resolution and exploration of alternate
solutions
Intrinsic ambiguity of music in contrast to language may
have promoted repeated exposure (listening)
Computational architecture of auditory scene analysis,
schema-based perceptual and cognitive problem-
solving
Zatorre and Salimpoor,
2013
Biological adaptation via reward-based emotion process-
ing of predictable sound patterns generalizing to
other kinds of stimuli
Common antecedents in vocal call sounds Co-opted limbic, striatal (dopaminergic), autonomic
reward circuits, linked perceptual and cognitive
mechanisms
Juslin, 2013 Internal simulations of events that substitute for overt,
risky actions
Divergence from common communicative system; music
grounded in vocal emotion and semantic value in
expectancies
Pattern analysis, meaning attribution and learning;
problem-solving for ‘translation’ of musical
‘language’
Present account Coding of potentially costly social routines for rehearsal,
prediction and adaptation in surrogate low-cost form
Abstracted from call sound precursors in parallel, with
diverging structural and semantic properties
Partly music-specific interaction of perceptual, cognitive,
affective and autonomic mechanisms, critically
exposed by brain damage and dysfunction
Representative accounts are presented and the table is organized according to the major theme of each account; these themes are inter-related and there is considerable overlap between accounts. ITPRA,
imagination–tension–prediction–reaction–appraisal model (Huron, 2006)
Brain disorders andmusic biology SCAN (2015) 445
KEY COMPONENTS OF THE MODEL
Vocal signal processing
Call sounds are widely used by primates to convey emotionally laden
conspecific information, particularly over long distances where visual
cues are reduced (Ghazanfar and Santos, 2004); this information
typically includes emotional states of immediate biological relevance
(for example, proximity of danger, a food source or a mate; see
Figure 1). Such ‘referential emotive vocalizations’ (Brown, 2000b)
have both affective (internal emotional state) and semantic (external
referent) specificity; these aspects may have been modulated primarily
by pitch (intonation) and temporal features (call sound identity and
segmentation). Non-human primates show some contextual flexibility
of vocal communication (Tomasello and Call, 1997) to convey a
relatively fine-grained repertoire of emotions and caller identity
(Ghazanfar and Santos, 2004; Goodall, 2004). Certain primates
combine call sounds to convey simple semantic messages (Arnold
and Zuberbuhler, 2006) or gradations of feeling (Estes, 1992) and
call sound concatenation might constitute an early precursor to the
extended combinatorial vocal signalling of humans (Fitch, 2006a).
Furthermore, certain non-human primates (notably marmosets)
engage in ‘conversations’ with cooperative vocal turn-taking
(Takahashi et al., 2013). The essentially dynamic nature of sound
allows primate callers to programme the temporal order in which
key elements of the vocal message are presented. An enhanced capacity
for vocal sequence production and processing in early hominids may
have enabled blending of emotional content to represent more com-
plex affective states, particularly via the medium of longer-timescale
suprasegmental intonation patterns (see Figure 1). This stage may have
been facilitated by more extended intimate vocal exchanges among
bonded (e.g. mother–infant) dyads (Mithen, 2005). A pair-bonding
context may have established the linkage between vocal precursors of
music and dopaminergic, hormonal and other biological reward sys-
tems (Dunbar et al., 2012; Salimpoor et al., 2013). Furthermore, pri-
mate dyadic vocal exchanges are characterized by heightened pitch
variation, rich harmonic content and reciprocity, as exemplified by
human ‘motherese’ (Saint-Georges et al., 2013) and gibbon songs
(Koda et al., 2013).
In line with previous suggestions (Mithen, 2005), we speculate that
use of call sounds in this way may have consolidated a fundamental
Fig. 1 Proposed evolution of music as a code for transmitting surrogate mental states. The figure schematizes our model of the biological role of music in human evolution. Putative neurobiological problems
that could have formed a basis for evolutionary selection are listed (left panels) together with proposed ‘solutions’ mediated by precursors of music (middle panels) and language (right panels), respectively.
Although diagrammed here as a series of discrete ‘stages’ (I–V), we envisage the evolution of music as an essentially continuous process with successive stages, reciprocally influencing earlier processes as they
became fully established (schematized here as reversible arrows) and increasingly abstract and autonomous coding at each stage; the final stage marks a transition from biological to cultural evolution that is
arguably ‘irreversible’. In addition, we propose that earlier stages of music and language evolution shared processing mechanisms with increasing divergence at later stages. Our early primate ancestors may
initially have used call sounds as vocal signals to convey to other members of the social group current states of immediate biological relevance (I), linking these with affective and perceptual brain mechanisms
and establishing the earliest progenitors of music and speech through preferential use of pitch and temporal features, respectively. Extended ‘public’ vocal exchanges may have facilitated use of call sound
sequences (II) for communicating more complex emotional states (proto-music) and objects and events in the environment (proto-speech), and ‘private’ off-line rehearsal of responses modulated by the
listener’s own mental state. Combinatorial use of call sounds would, in turn, enable ‘meta-signalling’ of ambiguous emotional states and external phenomena (III) and resolution of these respective ambiguities
through characteristically musical processes (e.g. harmonic expectancy) or language processes (e.g. association with prior object concepts). This meta-signalling capacity promoted the generation of emergent
autonomous messages not closely tied to a particular mental state. Biologically and socially adaptive signalling (IV) for referential re-coding of objects and events in the world would then have entailed learning
of language rules, whereas adaptive signalling for transmitting mental states engaged musical codes for rehearsing and predicting mental states in self and others. Stages I–III would have interacted
cooperatively with development of an increasing capacity for mentalizing and ‘theory of mind’; music would then have been the most readily available vehicle for re-coding emotional mental states in surrogate
form without engaging potentially costly social routines. Emergence of fully adaptive signalling would have enabled creation of musical and linguistic socio-cultural artefacts for autonomous transmission as
‘memes’ subject to cultural evolution.
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perceptual diversification of hominid vocal communication into
primarily temporally segmented rhythmic ‘speech-like’ precursors
(Bergman, 2013) and primarily intonational and harmonic ‘music-like’
precursors. This diversification has its contemporary legacy in the
complex pitch and harmonic structures of music across human
cultures, in contradistinction to the generally less pitchy, but precisely
temporally structured architecture of most human languages
(Patel, 2008). We do not wish to over-emphasize the evolutionary
distinction between speech and music; certain persistent acoustic
(Curtis and Bharucha, 2010; Bowling et al., 2012) and neuroanatom-
ical (Escoffier et al., 2013) commonalities hint at an evolutionary
trajectory that was at least partly shared. This is particularly true of
music and prosody; however, whereas prosody has evolved primarily
as an amplifier of linguistic content (Saint-Georges et al., 2013), proto-
music may have been better suited to code less hard-wired or ambigu-
ous affective messages, such as those involved in the precarious rituals
of pair-bonding and sexual foraging (Goodall, 2004).
Public to private proto-musical signalling
This evolution of proto-musical vocal signalling may have been driven,
in part, by an increasingly complex and flexible interaction between
essentially ‘public’ (dyadic or group) and ‘private’ (own mental state)
communicative functions. As elementary call sounds with conspecifi-
cally sanctioned, ‘public’ semantic value became linked into sequences
modulated by caller emotional state in the context of primitive ‘con-
versations’, this would have promoted increasingly complex ‘off-line’
processing by the listener in preparing responses that were, in turn,
modulated by the listener’s own emotional state. This off-line process-
ing would, in turn, have set the stage for elaboration of fully autono-
mous privately rehearsed signals. While this public–private interaction
of communication codes would have operated for proto-linguistic as
well as proto-musical signals, it was proto-music (we argue) that, by
virtue of its acoustic properties, governed coding of emotional states.
Facility in transitioning between public and private proto-musical
signalling would have been socially and biologically advantageous both
at an individual and group level because it would tend (for example) to
promote empathy, pair bonding and social cohesion. This role of early
musical signalling could, therefore, plausibly have been subject to evo-
lutionary selection pressures. One might go further and propose cer-
tain ‘design features’ that these musical precursor codes were required
to possess to be selected; these features would include not only repeat-
ability and modularity (tending to promote efficient templating of
shared codes by other individuals), but also more contentiously, suf-
ficient ‘encryption’ to prevent uncontrolled access by all listeners (in
particular, competitors) to the caller’s internal emotional states and
potential vulnerabilities (Dunbar, 1999; Maynard Smith and Harper,
2003; Searcy and Nowicki, 2005). The proto-musical signalling we
envisage would have guaranteed such access preferentially to listeners
equipped and sufficiently motivated to engage in an active ‘code-
breaking’ exchange: typically, the caller’s immediate kin or close
social group. We speculate that key design features of modern music
reflect these early evolutionary pressures (Fitch, 2006a). We also sug-
gest that this evolutionary scenario would favour the development of
maximally efficient rather than unnecessarily elaborate musical codes,
which might explain both the unwonted power of ear worms and the
comparative rarity in our music-loving species of the genetic consti-
tutions exemplified by Mozart and Miles Davis.
Meta-signalling and resolution of ambiguities
Increasingly sophisticated combinatorial use of call sounds by early
hominids would have facilitated transmission of signals coding
ambiguous states, whether instantiated in the world at large
(proto-language) or in private emotional experience (proto-music).
Successful resolution of such ambiguities would facilitate appropriate
behavioural responses. We argue that the development of proto-
linguistic and proto-musical ‘meta-signalling’ capacities provided a
medium for representing and adaptively resolving apparent ambigu-
ities and inconsistencies in the arena of the physical environment and
social interactions, respectively. The scope of such meta-signalling
would have extended to complex affective mental states accompanying
social scenarios without immediate survival value; for example, those
accompanying grief and mourning, social dominance or submission.
Indeed, social situations routinely require abstraction of their inter-
personal meaning and resolution of ambiguity if they are to be man-
aged successfully; a prime instance of which is sarcasm (Kipps et al.,
2009).
Disambiguation of emotional states expressed in music may be
based at least, in part, on learned associations about emotional
coding derived from other sensory modalities (Gosselin et al., 2007).
However, rather than a single pre-eminent solution (as is typically
required, for example, with perceptual ambiguities), adaptive reso-
lution of novel, ambiguous emotional states (like those accompanying
many social scenarios) may require their conflicting elements to be
kept on-line and ‘harmonized’. Proto-musical signalling would have
provided an evolutionary means to achieve this (see Figure 1). The
forerunners of musical harmony would have enabled layering of dis-
parate codes into a more complex message; pitch relationships create
structure where, for other kinds of sounds, there would be cacophony
and provide a means to resolve external disorder in a fundamentally
predictable way. Abstract representation of blended, ambiguous or
non-goal-directed emotional states or ‘floating intentionality’ is a
feature of music today (Trost et al., 2012). More particularly,
resolution of ambiguity and release of musical tension based on
established harmonic and other expectancies appears to underpin
strong emotional responses (including ‘chills’) across musical genres
(Huron, 2006; Salimpoor et al., 2011, 2013). The ‘rules’ governing
these expectancies are learned implicitly by members of the same
musical culture (Tillmann, 2005).
The difficulty of aligning musical emotions with emotions expressed
via other signalling channels (particularly vocal and facial expressions)
has been advanced as an argument against a biological role of music
(Allen et al., 2013). However, certain analogies between music and
other emotional channels have been demonstrated; there is conver-
gence of emotional coding between musical and prosodic signals
(Juslin and Laukka, 2003; Jackendoff and Lerdahl, 2006; Thompson
et al., 2012), while at least some musical emotions appear canonical
between cultures (Fritz et al., 2009). We argue that the very ambiguity
and unclassifiability of musical emotions is close to the biological
purpose of music. We propose that musical emotions are inherently
difficult to classify because they are evolved to model the blendedness
and ambiguity of our emotional reactions to our social milieu rather
than merely recapitulating emotions conveyed more efficiently via
other channels.
Surrogate and predictive mental state coding
Development of a capacity for layering proto-musical codes might
plausibly have facilitated the generation of ‘emergent’ messages not
closely tied to a particular emotional state and ultimately, generation
of such messages de novo. The coding of expectancies would further
have enabled predictive signalling: a powerful means to establish
proto-musical dialogues among group members and to allow the act
of generating proto-music to influence the caller’s own rehearsed
mental states reciprocally. We regard the emergence of such flexible
autonomous signalling not bound to immediate emotional
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contingencies as a critical stage in the evolution of music, as it will have
paved the way for use of musical signalling to code surrogate mental
states (see Figure 1). We propose that this elaboration of musical vocal
coding among our hominid ancestors evolved in tandem with (and
reinforced) a capacity for interpreting the mental states of self and
others: ‘theory of mind’ or ‘mentalizing’ (Frith and Frith, 2003).
This capacity is multi-dimensional, including both cognitive (beliefs)
and affective–perceptual (feeling states) components (Tager-Flusberg
and Sullivan, 2000; Downey et al., 2013). It is the affective–perceptual
dimension that we emphasize here in respect to music. Music has been
shown to model complex affective mental states such as ‘dreamy’,
‘adventurous’, ‘comforting’ or ‘seductive’ for healthy listeners
(Downey et al., 2013). This capacity is not contingent on previously
learned associations, suggesting that coding psychological states is an
important ‘indexical’ dimension of musical meaning that may parallel
referential object associations in language (Koelsch, 2011).
Understanding of agency in music (in common with other social cog-
nitive functions) is mediated by a distributed anterior cortico-
subcortical network (Frith and Frith, 2003; Zahn et al., 2007;
Steinbeis and Koelsch, 2009; Abu-Akel and Shamay-Tsoory, 2011).
A capacity for predictive signalling of surrogate mental states would
have enabled emotional states to be rehearsed remotely from the cor-
responding experience in the world at large. This process would, in
turn, have allowed evaluation of such states in recoded form for their
biological cost and reward potential, both by the caller and by others in
the social group. The young of many primate species have a protracted
period of immaturity with substantial parental investment and ex-
tended opportunities for learning about and modelling the social en-
vironment (Tomasello and Call, 1997). Imitation and other forms of
social learning appear to contribute to the establishment and differen-
tiation of primate ‘cultures’ (Whiten et al., 1999). Contemporary pri-
mate species engage in a variety of ‘play’ activities that rehearse
essential behaviours such as fighting, mating and hunting. These activ-
ities enhance social behavioural flexibility and enable younger individ-
uals to learn about their physical and social environments and their
relative social standing within the group (Goodall, 2004; Palagi, 2006).
Play detached from routine life activities has been proposed as an
essential ingredient of human cultures (Huizinga, 1955; Nielsen,
2012). Vocal (including proto-musical) behaviours could plausibly
have become similarly adapted in our own primate ancestors. The
relevant ‘codes’ would be acquired, first, by closely associated members
of the group (e.g. within dyads), before ultimately becoming adapted
for use within the wider group. We envisage that initially this would
have entailed reactivation of affective states recently experienced by
particular callers. Later, however, musical codes may have come to
signal affective states remotely experienced or never experienced by
callers or listeners. Such independence would enable affectively laden
social routines to be experienced in surrogate form within the social
group. Essentially, proto-music would have become a cognitive tool
with which to teach and vicariously experience the affective content of
important, recurring social behaviours such as courtship, childrearing,
grieving, social dominance and submission.
This feature of our model is in line with the notion that music
enables internal simulations of events that substitute for overt risky
actions (Juslin, 2013); here, we emphasize actions (behaviours) moti-
vated by affective mental states. Sharing of mutually intelligible, proto-
musical codes would allow highly arousing or potentially distressing
emotional states experienced by particular members of the group to be
managed within the group as a whole; much indeed as we still use
music today (over scales ranging from private listening and intimate
gatherings such as weddings and funerals to large-scale public events
such as the September 11 memorial concerts). Furthermore, repeated
shared rehearsals of musical codes within hominid groups would have
maximized opportunities for exploration and refinement of alternative
‘solutions’ to the ‘problem’ resolved by the code. There are perhaps
contemporary analogies here in listeners’ propensity repeatedly to seek
variations on the same music (Pressnitzer et al., 2011) or the on-line
improvisatory exchanges of jazz ensembles.
Among primate species, the emotional states and behaviours around
recurring social scenarios such as mate selection, aggression and be-
reavement are physiologically and psychologically expensive. These
states are associated with potentially harmful neurohormonal, cardio-
vascular and other stress responses that can be modulated by music
(Mostofsky et al., 2013; Thoma et al., 2013). The process of rehearsal
would have consolidated the association of proto-musical codes with
previously experienced arousing sensory experiences stored in mem-
ory; ultimately such rehearsal might have led to codification of a
shared lexicon of schemas representing recurrent social routines,
thereby further promoting social cohesion across the group
(Pressnitzer et al., 2011). Selection pressure for surrogate mental
state encoding could have come from advantages for reproduction
and survival conferred by rehearsing biologically significant, arousing
mental states without the considerable potential cost of enacting them.
As proto-musical vocal behaviours were already invested evolutionarily
with high reward potential (Figure 1), individuals would be predis-
posed to engage in these behaviours, thereby facilitating opportunities
for natural selection and ultimately, reinforcing the linkage with brain
reward mechanisms. High arousal states engendered by music tend to
be highly valued and to generate powerfully pleasurable responses
(Salimpoor et al., 2009), independently of affective valence. Among
primate species, a preference for arousing music over less arousing
auditory experiences appears to be a distinctively human predispos-
ition (McDermott and Hauser, 2005). The pleasure we take in highly
arousing, even sad, music may derive in part from experiencing this
affective mental state without any actual correlate or cost to our well-
being in the world at large (Allen et al., 2013). Rehearsal of surrogate
mental states is likely to have enhanced the individual’s capacity for
empathy; this in turn, would have facilitated pair bonding, with ad-
vantages for mate selection and nurturing of offspring.
From a neuroanatomical perspective, mental state coding and inter-
pretation engage a hierarchy of brain mechanisms, including those
mediating affective value and biological reward (Abu-Akel and
Shamay-Tsoory, 2011). Surrogate mental state attribution is therefore
a plausible candidate to have recapitulated many of the component
cognitive operations at work during the early evolution of music and
this process of recapitulation is mirrored in a distributed neural cir-
cuitry. More speculatively, music may have a role in ‘repairing’ dys-
functional (though structurally intact) network elements and
reintegrating emotional and cognitive processing in situations where
these have become dislocated (Allen et al., 2013).
Music as a socio-cultural artefact
A substantial problem for all biological theories of music is the current
status of music primarily as an art form (a socio-cultural artefact) with
no obvious biological purpose. We do not of course wish to imply here
that music is now solely a diversion or a means of generating pleasure.
In most societies, (including the developed West) music continues to
play a pervasive role in rituals, social cohesion and cooperative action
among members of groups sharing a common musical culture
(Koelsch, 2013). Rather, we argue that, in becoming abstract and au-
tonomous, proto-musical communication codes became subject to
cultural evolution as well as biological selection pressure and that
over time, cultural evolution has become the primary force governing
the development and uses of music within human societies. This pro-
cess has also included the creation of other, non-vocal vehicles for
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conveying musical codes [in particular, musical instruments, which
date from at least as early as the Neolithic period (Zhang et al.,
1999)]. The diverse varieties of music across cultures could be
viewed (analogously with language diversity) as modus operandi for
teaching locally agreed musical codes to a universal cognitive algo-
rithm that transcends cultural boundaries (Fitch, 2006b). There are
many examples of cultural evolutionary imperatives powerfully mod-
ulating or supplanting human biological imperatives (for example,
ritual fasting, communal childrearing and voluntary celibacy). A
useful shorthand here may be the concept of musical ‘memes’
(Dawkins, 1976; see Figure 1). While we acknowledge the limitations
of this term, we use it here to emphasize the emergence of musical
phenomena subject primarily to social and cultural rather than biolo-
gical forces.
HOW DO BRAIN DISORDERS INFORM THE MODEL?
Evidence from brain disorders illuminates our model of the biolo-
gical role of music in at least four major ways. We now discuss
these with reference to the model as presented in Figure 1. Relevant
illustrative clinical disorders are summarized in Table 2.
Representative neuroanatomical profiles associated with particular
brain disorders are shown in Figure 2, coded with the aspects of
music processing that they putatively disrupt. The clinical evidence
is underpinned by an overarching principle, the componential or-
ganization of music processing. This concept is illustrated by neuro-
psychological dissociations between competencies for music vs other
complex cognitive phenomena (notably language) and among mu-
sical functions, observed in association both with focal brain lesions
and neurodegenerative diseases (Rohrer et al., 2006; Stewart et al.,
2006; Hailstone et al., 2009; Omar et al., 2010; Downey et al., 2013).
This fractionated organization argues for brain mechanisms that are
relatively specialized for music and may therefore have evolved to
process music or its evolutionary precursor.
Disorders of musical signal processing
A variety of selective deficits of elementary musical processingi.e.
deficits affecting the elements of music including spectrotemporal
characteristics of musical sources and relations between sourceshave
been described following focal brain damage (Mazzoni et al., 1993;
Peretz et al., 2001; McDonald, 2006; Stewart et al., 2006). Such deficits
may specifically impair emotional responses to music, producing ‘mu-
sical anhedonia’ (Griffiths et al., 2004; Satoh et al., 2011). Culprit le-
sions in such cases particularly involve medial temporal and limbic
structures, insula, auditory and temporo-parietal cortices linked to
distributed reward circuits. This circuitry is in proximity to the
brain substrates of human voice processing (Hailstone et al., 2011).
Considered collectively, this evidence points to brain mechanisms that
are at least relatively selective for musical signal processing, while at the
same time preserving intimate functional and neuroanatomical rela-
tions with the neural mechanisms of human ‘call sound’ processing.
The evidence further highlights a critical linkage between cortical
mechanisms of musical pattern analysis and subcortical networks for
processing reward and emotion (Pressnitzer et al., 2011; Zatorre and
Salimpoor, 2013).
Disorders of musical code processing
Certain clinical phenomena demonstrate that the human brain is
primed to rehearse and value particular musical ‘codes’; examples in-
clude abnormally enhanced, intrusive and repetitive musical imagery
manifesting as ‘ear worms’ [pieces replayed in the mind’s ear (Sacks,
2007; Beaman and Williams, 2010)] or musical hallucinations
[externalized percepts, particularly though not exclusively, occurring
after cortical deafferentation in acquired deafness (Griffiths, 2000;
Warren and Schott, 2006)]. These phenomena seem more likely to
be driven by simple ‘catchy’ melodies than more complex pieces
(Beaman and Williams, 2010). Even if the melodies are not reproduced
out of memory, this autonomous auditory activity recapitulates struc-
tural features derived from musical experience (Warren and Schott,
Table 2 Brain disorders and the biological role of music
Music processing taska Neuropsychological or behavioural deficit Clinical associations Neuroanatomical associations (see also Figure 2)
Elementary musical analysis
and emotion processing
(I)y
Selective deficits of musical scene analysis(Mazzoni
et al., 1993; McDonald, 2006), dissonance detection
(Peretz et al., 2001) and musical anhedonia (Griffiths
et al., 2004; Satoh et al., 2011)
Focal lesions of either cerebral hemisphere Particularly medial temporal and limbic structures,
insula, auditory and temporoparietal cortices; links
to subcortical reward circuits
Musical code processing (II) Selective deficits of melody perception (Stewart et al.,
2006); excessive processing or priming for specific
musical codes, e.g. musical hallucinosis (Griffiths,
2000) and musicophilia (Fletcher et al., 2013)
Focal lesions of either cerebral hemisphere; diseases of
ascending auditory pathways and neurotransmitter
systems and focal neurodegenerative processes, es-
pecially semantic dementia
Deficits particularly with superior and anterior temporal,
inferior frontal cortical damage; excessive processing
with deafferentation/cholinergic deficiency in early
auditory cortex, modulation of hippocampal inter-
actions with distributed cortical networks
Musical meta-signalling:
processing expectancies
and associations (III)y
Altered processing of musical harmony, musical emotion
associated with deficits or modulation of other chan-
nels of emotion processing (Peretz et al., 1994;
Bhatara et al., 2009; Matthews et al., 2009;Drapeau
et al., 2009; Gosselin et al., 2007,2011; Caria et al.,
2011; Omar et al., 2010,2011; Hsieh et al., 2012)
Focal lesions and degenerations involving fontal and
temporal lobes; developmental disorders, especially
autism
Particularly anterior temporal and inferior frontal cortices
and subcortical connections mediating emotional and
semantic associations
Coding surrogate mental
states (IV)
Specific deficit in attribution of affective mental states to
music correlated with other social cognition deficits
(Downey et al., 2013), ‘rescue’ of social attributions
by music (Bhatara et al., 2009), correlation of
musicality with social competence and emotional
awareness (Ng et al., 2013)
Developmental disorders, especially autism and Williams
syndrome; focal neurodegenerative processes, espe-
cially frontotemporal dementia
Ventromedial prefrontal, anterior temporal cortices
involved in mentalizing, frontoinsular projection neu-
rons (Seeley et al., 2006)
acorresponding putative stages in the evolutionary model we propose are indicated (in parentheses), see Figure 1; yevidence of linkage to non-musical processes of high neurobiological relevance; evidence
suggesting a specific neurobiological role of music or its precursors during human evolution. Overarching these lines of evidence is the componential organization of music processing, illustrated by
neuropsychological dissociations between competencies for music v other complex cognitive phenomena (notably language) and among musical functions: this fractionated organization argues for brain
mechanisms that are relatively specialized for music. Not indicated here are lesions that disrupt processing of music as a socio-cultural artefact (stage V of our model); for example, instrument apraxia and
deficits of musical reading and writing
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2006). Heightened interest in and appreciation of music may attain the
status of a specific, obsessional craving or ‘musicophilia’ in some clin-
ical situations, including temporal lobe epilepsy, stroke, neurodegen-
erative disease and post-trauma (Jacome, 1984; Rohrer et al., 2006;
Sacks, 2007; Fletcher et al., 2013).
Disorders of musical meta-signalling
Altered processing of musical harmony and expectancies may follow
focal brain damage (Peretz et al., 1994), while impaired recognition of
musical emotions (variably associated with deficits or modulation of
other channels of emotion processing) has been described with focal
lesions and degenerations involving the fontal and temporal lobes and
developmental disorders, especially autism (Bhatara et al., 2009;
Matthews et al., 2009; Drapeau et al., 2009; Gosselin et al., 2011;
Caria et al., 2011; Omar et al., 2011; Hsieh et al., 2012). This evidence
supports a critical linkage between anterior temporal and inferior
frontal cortices and subcortical networks mediating emotional and
semantic associations, while at the same time allowing for a
componential specificity in the coactivation of particular network
components in response to music (Zatorre and Salimpoor, 2013).
Within the domain of musical emotion, the ability to recognize specific
emotions may dissociate from the general hedonic value of music
(Matthews et al., 2009; Omar et al., 2012; Mas-Herrero et al., 2014).
This dissociation suggests that the emotional response to music itself
has a componential architecture, as one might anticipate if the brain
systems that process music evolved to link autonomic, affective and
cognitive mechanisms over the course of human phylogeny.
Disorders of musical mental state coding
Finally (and crucially for our model), brain disorders allow us to assess
the extent to which music can model generic cognitive processes such
as theory of mind. Frontotemporal dementia is the paradigmatic
acquired disorder of human social behaviour (Seeley et al., 2006;
Kipps et al., 2009). These patients are deficient in attributing affective
mental states (but not non-mental representations) to music (Downey
et al., 2013). This deficit maps onto the previously proposed distinc-
tion between ‘indexical’ and ‘iconic’ dimensions of musical meaning
(Koelsch, 2011). In addition, the deficit correlates with standard
Fig. 2 Neuroanatomy of music processing and effects of brain disorders. The central panel shows a schematic view of the brain dissected to reveal networks involved in music processing (the left hemisphere is
projected forward here; however, relevant brain regions are bi-hemispherically distributed). Colours superimposed on the schematic code brain regions mediating broad cognitive operations underpinning music
processing, based on normal functional imaging and clinical evidence. The primary cognitive operations associated with the regions are coded, as most regions are implicated in more than one operation
(corresponding putative stages in the evolutionary model we proposed are numbered in parentheses, see Figure 1): yellow (I, II), perceptual analysis and imagery; green, biological motivation and reward
encoding, autonomic responses (I, III); red, expectancies, associations and affective evaluation (III); blue, mental state processing and behavioural evaluation (IV). These operations are likely to be at least, in
part, componential and hierarchically organized. Key: AC, anterior cingulate cortex; Am, amygdala; BG, basal ganglia; Hi, hippocampus; Ins, insula; mPFC, medial prefrontal cortex; NA, nucleus accumbens; OFC,
orbitofrontal cortex; STG, superior temporal gyrus; TP, temporal pole; TPJ, temporo-parietal junction. The flanking panels show representative coronal brain sections from patients exhibiting abnormal music
processing outlined according to the cognitive operations primarily implicated in that condition (the left hemisphere is displayed on the right in each case): (a) tumour involving temporo-parietal cortices and
subcortical connections, associated with musical hallucinations; (b) infarction of insula and amygdala associated with selective loss of emotional response to music; (c) semantic dementia with focal, asymmetric
anterior temporal lobe atrophy, associated with musicophilia and altered emotion coding in music; (d) frontotemporal dementia with selective bilateral frontal lobe atrophy associated with impaired ability to
infer mental states from music and altered emotion coding in music. The scheme shown here complements the biological features presented in Table 2: each of these disorders (a–d) illustrates the
componential neural architecture of music processing; (b) illustrates the effects of disrupted links with generic emotion processing mechanisms; (c) illustrates abnormal priming to particular musical codes; while
(d) illustrates impaired modelling of surrogate mental states from music.
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measures of social inference and empathy in patients’ everyday lives
and has a neuroanatomical substrate in ventromedial prefrontal and
anterior temporal lobe areas previously implicated in mentalizing and
social concept representation (Frith and Frith, 2003; Zahn et al., 2007,
2009; Steinbeis and Koelsch, 2009; Figure 2). In the face of often pro-
found deficits of mentalizing and other aspects of social cognition,
music appears to be an island of relatively preserved emotionality in
autism (Allen et al., 2009; Molnar-Szakacs and Heaton, 2012; Allen
et al., 2013). Music may even partly ‘rescue’ deficient social attribu-
tions by autistic individuals (Bhatara et al., 2009). However, cognitive
processing of musical emotions in autism may be quantitatively atyp-
ical and may be underpinned by altered engagement of ‘hub’ brain
regions (in particular, anterior insula cortex) that integrate emotional
responses (Caria et al., 2011; Molnar-Szakacs and Heaton, 2012).
Musicality correlates with emotional awareness and social competence
in Williams syndrome (Ng et al., 2013). Together, such studies present
a prima facie case that mental state encoding was a key candidate
function of music (or its precursors) during the evolution of the re-
sponsible brain systems. These disorders further delineate a distributed
brain network that is critical for the modality-specific integration of
emotions conveyed by music with other sensory affective channels,
mentalizing and other processes involved in social cognition (Abu-
Akel and Shamay-Tsoory, 2011; Omar et al., 2011; Dowwney et al.,
2013). Work in frontotemporal dementia has demonstrated that the
culprit network contains phylogenetically specialized neurons that are
likely to support complex social behaviour (Seeley et al., 2006).
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Our model of music biology foregrounds predictive and adaptive
decoding of patterned vocal signals and is, therefore, most closely
aligned with previous accounts emphasizing a problem-solving or pat-
tern-decoding function of music (see Table 1). However, the model
incorporates elements that link other accounts emphasizing the playful
potential of music (Pressnitzer et al., 2011), its social significance
(Darwin, 1871; Cross, 2005; McDermott and Hauser, 2005; Mithen,
2005; Bharucha et al., 2006; Peretz, 2006; Patel, 2008; Koelsch, 2013)
and role in vocal learning (Fitch, 2006a,b). Novel explanatory features
of our model compared with previous accounts include the coding of
private complex emotional mental states in surrogate form, and the
potential insights held by clinical disorders of music processing into
the componential neural architecture of music coding and mental state
encoding. We have argued that a partly music-specific interaction of
perceptual, cognitive, affective and autonomic mechanisms is critically
exposed by effects of brain damage and dysfunction.
Our model suggests several avenues for future experimental evalu-
ation. The vocalizations of other primate species could be compared
quantitatively with human singing (Bergman, 2013). The limits of our
capacity to rehearse mental states via music and the cognitive bound-
aries between music and other kind of vocal signalling could be as-
sessed under ecological conditions by analysing the mentalizing
properties of such special cases as whistled languages (Carreiras
et al., 2005), by comparing musical traditions and cultures beyond
Western art music (Janata et al., 2012) or perhaps by constructing
artificial music (Charlton et al., 2012) with specified neuropsycho-
logical properties. This, in turn, might allow formulation of a
common trans-cultural lexicon of mental routines that can be mod-
elled in music and their musical signifiers. In particular, by studying
the effects of brain disorders, we can establish the extent to which brain
systems are critical for music cognition, the degree to which more
generic processes (such as theory of mind) are affected in tandem
with music, the role of music in modulating such processes and
their neurobiological substrates. Our clinical perspective leads us to
assert that the pleasure we take in music may sugar the pill our brains
once required to learn their social world.
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